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One of the most controversial of the questions raised by the problem of unauthorized practice concerns the appearance by laymen in a representative capacity before
boards, bureaus, commissions, and other quasi-judicial bodies, because the solution depends more upon factors which are embodied in the economic and social structure than
upon any particular definition of what may or may not constitute the practice of law.
The answers which have been given to the question have not afforded universal
satisfaction, nor is the answer the same in all of the different jurisdictions. Public
policy as defined by the legislature, as well as the socio-political opinion of a judge,
has led to varying opinions.
To find a satisfactory solution requires an approach based upon a realization that
the problem is not engendered by lawyers and practitioners-as I shall denominate
the lay group-bickering over fees. This incidental feature, which may be so played
upon as to seem the real issue, is an unfortunate offshoot. In reality, the solution
requires coalition of three points of view: first, that of the public; second, that of
the lawyer; and third, that of the practitioner. While the interest of the public must
be considered of paramount importance, any answer which places undue emphasis
upon any one of these points of view, or which ignores one, will probably prove
unsatisfactory.
Therefore, an analysis which takes cognizance of all of these points of view
should be made of the answers to this question. Three distinct answers have been
offered: first, some states hold that any person may practice before any board or
quasi-judicial body.' This attitude proceeds upon a very limited construction of what
constitutes the practice of law. Any board, department, bureau, or commission which
is not a court in the strict sense is not a judicial body, according to these opinions,
but a branch of the executive department. Hence, laymen may appear before these
*A.B., LL.B., 1931, LL.M., r932, University of Colorado. Member of the Colorado Bar, practicing in
Denver. Editor, Dicta. Instructor, Westminster Law School. Formerly Assistant to the Director of the
National Bar Program of the American Bar Association. Contributor to legal periodicals.
1
North Dakota is probably such a state. There are no statutes forbidding such practice and the Supreme Court has taken a very restricted view of its powers over unauthorized practice of law. Murphy v.
Townley, 274 N. W. 857 (N. D. 1937). In general4 see cases collected in' HIcxIs & KATz, UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAw (1934) 69, and BRAND, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE DacisioNs (937)
783-
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tribunals as "agents" or "attorneys in fact" for clients. These decisions overlook the
accepted theory of administrative law that these bodies are part judicial in their
nature. It shoud be pointed out, however, that in some instances these states have
statutes which so define "practice of law" as to exclude therefrom appearances before
administrative bodies, or which expressly authorize laymen to appear before the
administrative board created by the statute.
This approach to the problem takes into account only the point of view of the
practitioner. No safeguard is provided for the interest of the public. It permits untrained individuals bound by no code of ethics, and unhampered by any disciplinary
supervision, to engage in the business of representing claimants. All of the evils of
champerty, maintenance, and unethical practice may flourish without restraint. Any
unscrupulous individual, any disbarred attorney, any ignoramus may be a practitioner under this doctrine, for there are no standards of ethics or of education, nor
is any method of discipline provided. In addition to failing to protect the welfare
of the public, this answer forces men who have spent years in formal training to
acquire the skill to practice law to compete with individuals who may be utterly
lacking in formal education or acceptable norms of conduct. Lawyers, who are unable to advertise or solicit business, are opposed by laymen who often actively solicit
business in the broadest sense of the phrase. This is unfair competition of the worst
kind and is decidedly an unhealthy condition not only for the bar, but for the public.
The public in the very early days of this nation was faced with the same problem
in regard to lawyers, for admission to the bar was a mere formality. But as public
rights began to receive recognition, it was seen that some curb must be placed upon
the so-called rights of the individual. Hence, standards of education, conduct, and
ethics were imposed upon those who desired to become lawyers, and these standards
were continually raised; for it came to be recognized that the practice of the law
was affected with a public interest and that it was both the right and the duty of the
state to regulate and control it so that public welfare would be served and promoted.
Hence, this first answer should be disregarded by all concerned, for it is harmful
to the public, unfair to the lawyer, and unsatisfactory to the qualified practitioner.
The lesson taught by the revolts against the untrained lawyers in Colonial New England should be heeded by those practitioners who continue to urge that no restraint
should be placed upon their practice. No system can survive built upon a foundation
which is fundamentally opposed to the public welfare, nor can the first answer be
accepted permanently even if attempts are made to have the various boards and
bureaus prescribe individual standards of admission and ethics. Such a solution can
at the most be only a makeshift one. The federal government has attempted this
2
solution only to find that it has resulted in chaos.
Since July 4, 1894, the United States Government has made some scattered and
unrelated attempts to deal with this problem. It has a host of boards, bureaus, and
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commissions, each of which has its own special rules regarding the admission to
practice before them. In general, they may be grouped into two main divisions. The
first group, of which the Bureau of Pensions is a fair example, permits any person to
practice before it if an application is made, an oath is taken, and a certificate as to
character, reputation, and general fitness is furnished. The second group, of which
the Board of Tax Appeals is outstanding, admits only licensed attorneys or qualified
public accountants to practice before it. The first group of administrative bodies
provides little, if any, method for disciplining its practitioners; and as a result, laymen, without any particular educational qualifications or training, and without any
conception of ethics, run rampant. On the other hand, the second group has provided
elaborate methods to discipline the practitioners. The Treasury Department, for
example, lists numerous grounds for invoking disciplinary measures and provides
for a hearing before established divisions within the department. Unfortunately,
however, this elaborate machinery is seldom used. Disbarment from one commission
or bureau of the federal government will not, moreover, disbar one from practice
within other divisions of the same department, even less from other departments.
It will thus be seen that the federal picture is even more chaotic and confusing than
that existing in those states which have set the administrative bodies to drift as they
pleased so far as regulations over admissions and discipline of the practitioners are
concerned.
The second answer to our problem states that laymen may appear before the
quasi-judicial tribunals only so long as their work does not involve the necessity for
special legal skill and training. What may or may not constitute an encroachment is
left for judicial definition in each case. Thus, in Pennsylvania, the court in the case
of Shortz v. Farre1 3 permitted the practitioner to prepare and file pleadings in workmen's compensation cases, because the "pleadings" are "executed on forms prepared
by the board, are elementary in character, and do not rise to the dignity of pleadings
as that term is understood in other judicial proceedings." But this court expressly
enjoined laymen from appearing before the referee in a representative capacity.
Under a recent Ohio decision, Goodman v. Beall,4 laymen may prepare pleadings
and appear in a representative capacity before the State Industrial Commission on the
original hearing. However, "rehearing proceedings before the commission do constitute the practice of law and must be conducted exclusively and personally by an
attorney or attorneys at law, duly admitted to practice." Under the Ohio statute, the
record made at the rehearing becomes the basis for "an appeal" to the court of common pleas; and the decision of the court on this appeal is limited to the evidence
submitted at the rehearing.
The answer proposed by this group of decisions is likewise unsatisfactory. It is
open to the objections urged against the first answer, namely, that the interests of
327 Pa. 8z, 193 Ad. 20 (i937).
Ohio St. 427, 2oo N. E. 470 (1936); cf. State ex rel. Juergens v. Industrial Commission, 127 Ohio
St. 524, 189 N. E. 445 (i934); Dunlap v. Lebus, 112 Ky. 237, 65 S. W. 441 (1901).
'130

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

the public and lawyers are not protected due to the lack of standards of ethics and
education. No control over the practitioner is left to the public. However, the
answer is undoubtedly more fair to the lawyer for it separates certain functions from
what may constitute the practice of law, permitting the practitioner to practice
within the segregated sphere, while restricting him from invading certain defined
preserves which constitute the practice of law.
But this answer creates an unsettled condition engendered by the uncertainty
as to what particular sphere is open to the practitioner until there has been a judicial
determination. In other words, a judicial decision is necessary to define what constitutes the practice of law in so far as every particular board, bureau, commission,
or department is concerned, and these decisions may vary as much as the individual
temperament of the judge deciding the case. It is no answer to say that the legislature
in the creation of these administrative bodies can outline what constitutes the practice
of law in each particular instance, for the courts have uniformly held that the judicial
branch of government alone has the inherent right to determine what constitutes
unauthorized practice and to control those admitted to the bar.5 In addition, the
same unstable level exists whether the legislature or judicial department of the
government attempts to draw the boundary line. It is hardly an answer which can
be accepted by the practitioner for he is left dangling in the realm of uncertainty as
to what he may legitimately do and is given no protection from the unscrupulous
acts of his associates.
There can be no doubt that a small minority of practitioners desire that certain
very definite standards be imposed upon the group for they are aware that to permit
any person to become a practitioner is injurious to those who are sincerely attempting to represent clients before administrative bodies in a professional manner. There
also can be no doubt that a small group of practitioners are as well if not better
trained and qualified to act before these quasi-judicial boards than are most lawyers.
To deny the trained practitioner the right to appear often works an injustice to him
and to those who would be his clients, and in the broad sense is not for the best
interest of the public.
The third answer permits only lawyers to practice before the quasi-judicial bodies.
This solution is apparently accepted in Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and perhaps
New York. The court in Illinois" found this answer by the following process of
reasoning:
"Administrative law, although of comphratively recent growth, is recognized today as
an important branch of the law. Classes for the study thereof are now taught in many
of our leading law schools. Relatively speaking, not many years ago that part of a legal
education was unknown to the curriculums of law colleges. In addition to the rigid educational requirements, the applicant must possess a good moral character. These prerequisites are not for the purpose of creating a monopoly in the legal profession nor for its
'See, e. g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935).
'People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 II. 346, 353, 8 N. E. (2d) 941, 944 (1937);
State Bar v. Waldron (Dist. Ct., Okla. 1935), BRND, o .cit. supra note z, at 442.
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protection, but are for the better security of the people against incompetency and dishonesty."
"It is elementary that a great portion of the present-day practice of law is conducted
outside the courtroom. The respondent urges that because the legislative act relating to
the Industrial Commission grants to that body the right to promulgate rules governing
the procedure before it, and the commission has adopted a rule permitting a party to appear before it by his attorney or 'agent,' he, as agent of the claimant, may lawfully appear
before the commission as the representative of the client and try his claim there. Even
though the Industrial Commission is merely an administrative body, yet, if what the
respondent did for a fee, in the presentation of and hearing of a practitioner's claim before
that body, amounted to the practice of law, a rule of the commission purporting to grant
him that privilege is of no avail to him. The General Assembly has no authority to grant
a layman the right to practice law. It follows that any rule adopted by the commission,
purporting to bestow such privilege upon one not a duly licensed attorney at law, is void.
Nor can the General Assembly lawfully declare not to be the practice of law, those
activities the performance of which the judicial department may determine is the practice
of law."
7
The Illinois court distinguishes the basis for its reasoning from Goodman v. Bealu
on the ground of the particular statutes involved in each state, pointing out that the
proceedings on rehearing in Ohio correspond with the allowance of claims by the
commission on the original hearing in Illinois.
In Michigan, however, a circuit court has made no attempt to distinguish between
8
any statutes which may be involved. In the case of Michigan State Bar v. McGregor,

decided in 1935, the court simply stated:
"It is urged that the Department of Labor is not a court but an administrative body
and all acts done before it or in connection with it are outside the practice of law. True
the Department of Labor and Industry is not a court. But the doctrine of res adjudicata
applies to its proceedings and its decisions are binding upon all parties when not appealed
from.
"It is a matter of common knowledge and a fact of which the court may take judicial
notice, that the Department of Labor and Industry, acting through its commissioners
sitting as a board, and through its deputy commissioners, holds hearings throughout the
state which are conducted under well defined and printed rules; considers legal questions,
applies legal principles and weighs facts under legal rules. Litigating parties appear before
deputy commissioners and before the full board by attorneys almost as universally as they
do in courts of record. Practice before this board is an extensive branch of the law
business."
'Supra note 4. If the decision is actually based upon this ground, Illinois properly belongs in the
second group. But the distinction between the statutes involved does not seem to be the true basis. If it is,
then the dissenting opinion of Justice Shaw, which is based upon lack of inherent power of the court,
would seem to arrive at the correct legal solution; for if the court has no power to regulate practice and
to define it, then the matter must be left for statutory control.
'BRAND, op. cit. supra note a, at 258; ci. Clark v. Austin, so1 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. '937); Mandelbaum v. Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co., 16o Misc. 656, 290 N. Y. Supp. 462 (1936); Elfenbein v. Luckenback
Terminals, Inc., is N. J. L. 67, 166 Ad. 91 (1933). For a discussion based upon the Missouri case, see
Howard, Control of Unauthorized Practice before Administrative Tibunals in Missouri (s937) 2 Mo. L.
REV. 313.
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The Michigan court is not unmindful, however, of the fact that in some cases the

practitioner may be better qualified to practice than the average lawyer. While the
result reached in the particular case may not be the best so far as it pertained to this
defendant, yet the court properly felt itself without the power to give any decision
which would differentiate between the abilities and qualifications of the practitioners.
The answer given by this third group is not entirely acceptable. It unduly protects
the lawyers as against the practitioners, and fails to recognize that in the field of
administrative law a practitioner may more effectively and ably deal with the problems than a lawyer. Therefore, the interest of the public is served in part and denied
in part by this solution.
Consequently, it would seem best to disregard all of these answers. They all
have certain fundamental objections which cannot be eradicated by legislative meddling or judicial tinkering. The approach to a solution should be based upon a
recognition that administrative law is definitely grafted onto present governmental
structures, and that it fulfills a need which the courts at present are neither equipped
nor trained to satisfy. Since these administrative bodies are an accepted part of
government, it is certain that they will within a few years acquire a formality which
is now lacking to a large extent and that untrained litigants will be forced to demand

representation before them. Practitioners are then inevitable. Merely because of this
fact, it is not wise to open wide the portals to all who desire to act in a representative
capacity, nor to attempt to apply exactly the same requirements to these practitioners
which are now applied to lawyers.

While it is true that the enormous development in recent years of administrative
boards and tribunals has made for haphazard and arbitrary rules, yet there is no
reason to apply to these bodies the identical principles and philosophy which have
been applied to the courts, for if that is to be, administrative law loses its effective-

ness and would better be administered by the law courts. So, too, it would be unwise
to apply exactly the same standards to the practitioners as to the lawyers. No doubt
a uniform standard of ethics can well be adopted by both groups; but an attempt
to apply exactly the same training to the practitioner as required of the lawyer, or to
demand that the lawyer be trained as a practitioner should be trained will result in
wasted effort.
It would seem that the ultimate solution of this troublesome question requires
more than an attempt to formulate an all-inclusive definition of what constitutes
the practice of law. It requires a complete overhauling of that Gargantuan growth
which has been termed administrative law. New concepts, an effort for co-ordination,
a period of readjustment are among those things which are vitally needed to work
out this problem.
The only feasible solution yet to be advanced pertains to the federal government,

but it is easily adaptable to the state governments. The plan provides that the quasijudicial bodies be consolidated into an administrative tribunal divided into depart-
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ments. 9 The judges of this court would be composed of the experts who are the
heads of the now unrelated and uncoordinated administrative bodies. Uniform rules
of practice and procedure would exist before all of the various departments of the
tribunal.
With the consolidation of these various boards, bureaus, and commissions would
come uniform standards for the practitioners. Definite rules for admission to practice
and a code of ethics could be promulgated. The inevitable result would be the
creation of a practitioners' bar as a recognized branch of the judicial department.
This bar would require certain educational standards. These standards might differ
radically from those required of the lawyers. More emphasis would no doubt be
placed upon technical training in such fields as engineering, accounting, corporate
finance, and labor, employer relationships, and less emphasis, or none at all, upon
some subjects now studied in law schools such as real property and equity. Yet a
certain degree of formal education would be required before application for admission
to practice would be accepted.
The educational training for the practitioner would be based on the principles
underlying administrative law. It would recognize the need for training in such
specialized subjects as have heretofore been believed to be outside the formal education required of a lawyer. The present approach of law schools relating to adjective
law would have to be entirely revamped. Our present system of legal education in
this field is in many places arbitrary to the point of being despotic, unreasonable to
the point of being faintly humorous, and hopelessly out of keeping with the solution
of modern problems. The emphasis of the training of the practitioner would be less
on the previous rules of evidence, and more upon the development of a practical
method of placing all facts before a tribunal in a quick and efficient method. Thus,
the education of the practitioner and lawyer would differ gready-not that the practitioner should be any less trained in his field than the lawyer now is in his; merely
that the type of training would be different. The code of ethics naturally would be
the same for the lawyer and practitioner, and both could be subject to the same
disciplinary machinery.
For all purposes it would seem that the best practical method of correlating the
two proposed groups would be to create a bar with two divisions-perhaps three. One
division would be for the practitioners, members of which would be limited to practice before the administrative court. The second division would embrace the lawyers
practicing before the law and equity courts. A third division (not essential but possible) might be created, open to lawyers of prescribed experience, for practice in the
appellate courts on appeals from the administrative, and law and equity courts.
How could this bar be created? The problem is not weighty from a mechanical
aspect, although from the standpoint of human relationships it may require considerable. time and a vast amount of social adjustment before it can be accomplished.
To the writer it seems to comprehend, first of all, a unified court system. This means
'6x Am.

BAR ASs'sN RP. (1936) 720. But see AM. BAR Ass'N, ADVANCE PROGRAIt (1937) 165 at 184.
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that the outlined administrative tribunal must be created, and that all courts, including the administrative court, must be made a part of a unified system, supervised
and controlled by a supreme court. It also requires a complete reorganization of the
bar with provisions made for the divisions suggested above. Probably some form of
an integrated or federalized bar association would be a necessary concomitant of this
plan of reorganization.
The ideal plan, of course, would be to make a clean-cut two-fold reorganization
of the judicial branch of the government, involving the creation of the bar, and of
the unified court system. While, because of considerations of "practical politics," it
is perhaps impossible to make such a change immediately, yet it would be wise, it
seems, for all concerned to urge it lest the bar find itself in the position of the
medical societies with their battles between the "old school" and "new school" doctors.
The example of the men of medicine squabbling over fields of practice and rights
therein should be thoroughly considered by the lawyer and practitioner, for that very
sort of thing looms upon our horizons.
As a practical method of evolution, it might be wise to begin by first creating at
least a semi-professional group known as practitioners, with the ideal of leading
ultimately to the status of a professional body as suggested. As for the court reform,
it is a measure that is needed in itself in many states; and, while it is a part of the
proposal, steps to bring it about need not wait on the creation of the administrative
tribunal. Nor is there any necessity of holding back on either of these proposals
until the setting up of a practitioner's bar. A material advance on any of these fronts
should bring that much nearer the solution of the problem under consideration.

